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Abstract In this paper I will argue that, contrary to what most scholars are inclined to 
believe, there are important tensions between the later Wittgenstein’s views on language 
and Michael Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language acquisition. On one hand, 
Wittgenstein characterises the first steps into the acquisition of a first language as a 
matter of acquiring practical abilities, which, in an anti-intellectualistic vein, do not 
require any kind of knowledge. On the other hand, Tomasello employs a Gricean model 
of communication to describe pre-linguistic children’s communicative interactions, thus 
taking an intellectualist stance. According to this model, children are supposed to 
acquire the meanings of words because they are able to infer communicators’ intentions 
on the basis of the common ground (mutual knowledge) they establish with them. 
Eliciting this tension is of uttermost importance because: (i) it bears crucial implications 
for the explanatory relationships between language and thought; (ii) it is central to the 
heart of Tomasello’s project of explaining linguistic competency as based on 
communicative abilities. In the conclusion, I will argue that there are ways to ease the 
main tension if, following Richard Moore, basic communicative acts are conceived of as 
Minimally Gricean. 
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Tomasello, linguistic competency, practical abilities, 
knowledge 
Received 24 June 2018; accepted 09 November 2018. 
0. Introduction1 
Over the last three decades, researchers in linguistics and psychology have developed a 
usage-based approach to the study of language. Usage-based approaches reject one of 
the most fundamental assumptions of modern linguistics, first laid down by Ferdinand 
de Saussure and subsequently adopted by generative linguistics, namely, that the study 
of a language as a system (langue) should be independent of the study of a language as it 
is used (parole). More explicitly and in more direct opposition to the Chomskyan 
tradition, usage-based approaches see both linguistic expressions and linguistic 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to John Preston, Severin Schroeder, Harry Tappenden and my colleagues for having 
commented on an early draft of this work. I am especially grateful to Emma Borg for her invaluable help 
along the way. I am also grateful to Carolyn Wilde, for her understanding and encouragement, and to 
Richard Gipps, Constantine Sandis and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, for helpful discussions on these topics. 
What is valuable in this work is dedicated to Eva Picardi. 
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constructions as essentially serving communicative purposes, and they take 
communicative functions as explanatorily prior to the grammatical dimension of 
language. 
While the poverty of the stimulus argument2 lead Chomsky and his fellow travellers to a 
conception of language as an organ, and to the postulation of an innate Universal 
Grammar, usage-based linguists and psychologists follow a different strategy. They 
propose to re-conceptualize linguistic abilities in a less demanding way, while at the 
same time offering a more generous account of children’s domain-general cognitive 
skills, so to meet the challenge of giving a better explanation of how language might 
have evolved in phylogeny, and of how children come to master a language in ontogeny.  
Among the most eminent advocates of a usage-based approach, Michael Tomasello 
championed a usage-based theory of the grammatical dimension of language (2003), and 
provided a psychological account of language ontogenetic development and 
phylogenetic emergence (2008), without neglecting to enquire the cognitive 
underpinnings of the evolution and development of linguistic abilities (2014). 
Tomasello is clearly aware that the very expression ‘usage-based’ makes more than a 
philosophical bell ring. Almost every chapter in his most extensive treatments of the 
subject is introduced by a quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, and he explicitly 
presents his theory of language acquisition as inspired by, and in an important sense 
based on, the later Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning as use: 
 
The usage-based approach to linguistic communication may be summarized in the 
two aphorisms: 
 
- meaning is use 
- structure emerges from use 
 
‘Meaning is use’ represents an approach to the functional or semantic dimension 
of linguistic communication. It originated with Wittgenstein (1953) and other 
pragmatically based philosophers of language, who wanted to combat the idea that 
meanings are things and instead focus on how people use linguistic conventions to 
achieve social ends (Tomasello 2009: 1). 
 
Wittgenstein’s influence over Tomasello’s work has not been extensively studied, but 
researchers in the fields of psychology and linguistics,3 as well as most (though not all) 
Wittgenstein scholars acquainted with language acquisition studies,4 do not seem to find 
the association between Wittgenstein and Tomasello problematic. On the contrary, I 
will argue that while there are recognizably Wittgensteinian strands in Tomasello’s 
theorizing, in an important sense the core of his views on linguistic abilities and 
linguistic development are in sharp contrast with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on 
language and language acquisition.  
I will argue that the most important tension springs from a different conception of 
linguistic competency and the kind of knowledge required to master a language. On the 
one hand, Wittgenstein, at least from the Philosophical Investigations up to On Certainty, 
                                                          
2 The argument is, roughly, that children’s exposure to the uses of language vastly underdetermines the 
grammar of the language that they nonetheless acquire. The first incarnation of this argument is to be 
found in Chomsky (1959). 
3 Nelson (2009); Kern & Moll (2017); Moore (2014: 101). 
4  Huemer (2006: 214 fn. 12); Moyal-Sharrock (2016: 10-11; 2017: 586, 595); more problematically, 
Ground (2015: 317). 
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considers first-language acquisition as a matter of acquiring, at least initially, primitive 
practical abilities. According to Wittgenstein, these abilities are irreducibly practical 
because their acquisition does not presuppose, nor entail, the acquisition of any piece of 
(propositional) knowledge (Section 1). On the other hand, Tomasello describes pre-
linguistic children’s communicative interactions as instances of Gricean communication: 
children produce and understand communicative acts because they infer communicative 
intentions on the background of the common ground they are able to establish with 
others (Section 2). 
In other words, while Wittgenstein has an anti-intellectualist stance on the epistemic 
nature of our most basic linguistic abilities, Tomasello’s adoption of a Gricean model of 
communication seems to commit him to an intellectualist position.5 This contrast, rather 
than being shallow, is radical. On the one hand, Tomasello assigns a pivotal explanatory 
role to pre-linguistic communicative interactions in his theory of linguistic development. 
On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s conception of basic linguistic competency as the 
possession of practical abilities bears important implications for some of the main tenets 
of his later philosophy, especially with respect to the explanatory priority of language 
over thought. 6 
However, in the conclusion I will suggest that there are ways to ease some of the 
tensions between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Tomasello’s scientific theory if, 
following Richard Moore, one conceives of a certain class of communicative acts as 
‘Minimally Gricean’ (Section 3). 
 
 
1. «In the beginning was the deed» 
At least since he laid down the final draft of the first part of the Philosophical Investigations 
and up to the time in which he wrote the last pages of On Certainty, Wittgenstein thought 
that the acquisition of a first language is achieved, at least initially, by means of a training: 
 
A child uses such primitive forms of language when he learns to talk. Here the 
teaching [Lehren] of language is not explaining [Erklären], but training [Abrichten] 
(PI: §5b). 
 
The English word ‘training’ here is used to translate the German ‘Abrichtung’, a word 
that is correctly used only to talk about the training of non-human animals.7 A natural 
way to understand Wittgenstein’s wording would be to take ‘Abrichtung’ to refer to a 
form of conditioning.8 Even if this reading can find non-negligible textual evidence, it is 
better to avoid it, because, as a plain matter of fact, we do not train children to 
                                                          
5 This way of phrasing the point echoes Gilbert Ryle’s (1946) seminal distinction between knowing how 
and knowing that. Ryle’s distinction does not equate to Wittgenstein’s talk of practical abilities and 
knowledge. For instance, think about a swimming teacher who has lost the ability to swim (say, by injury), 
but is still able to teach others how to swim, thus showing the possession of the relevant know how. 
However, the distinction between knowing how to do something and possessing the corresponding 
ability can be ignored for the purposes of this paper, since the problematic cases do not arise in the 
context of first language acquisition. John Preston helped me achieve some clarity on this point. 
6 Michael Dummett (e.g., 1993: 166-187) made these connections clearly and insightfully and placed them 
at the very heart of his philosophy. Ian Ground (2015) addresses the problem of how to frame 
phenomena of ontogenetic ritualization with similar worries in mind. 
7 Huemer (2006: 207-208). 
8 Bakhurst (2015: 469); Williams (2010: 97); Huemer (2006: 208). It is interesting to notice, as Bakhurst 
does (2015: 470), that Quine thought of language acquisition in these terms. 
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mastering language-games in the same sense in which we train dogs and horses.9 More 
interestingly, even if we did train children by way of reinforcing stimulus-response 
linkages, this would not lead them to acquire a language.10 
My exegetical claim is that Wittgenstein’s phrasing is best read as hyperbolic and serving 
a specific rhetorical function, namely, to state emphatically that the initial steps into the 
acquisition of a first language do not presuppose, nor entail, the acquisition of any kind 
of knowledge, but only the possession of (irreducibly) practical abilities. This anti-
intellectualist stance becomes fully explicit in On Certainty: 
 
But is it wrong to say: “A child that has mastered a language-game must know 
certain things”?  
If instead of that one said “must be able to do certain things”, that would be a 
pleonasm, yet this is just what I want to counter the first sentence with (OC: §534). 
 
Significantly, in these later passages the word ‘training’ does not occur.11  However, 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the Augustinian picture of language can easily be bridged 
with his later remarks by showing that on both occasions he goes through the same 
thoughts. 
In the Philosophical Investigations, an important part of the training is said to take the form 
of an ostensive teaching: 
 
An important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s pointing to the 
objects, directing the child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering a 
word; for instance, the word ‘slab’ as he displays that shape. (I do not want to call 
this ‘ostensive explanation’ or ‘definition’, because the child cannot as yet ask what 
the name is. I’ll call it ‘ostensive teaching of words’. – I say that it will form an 
important part of the training, because it is so with human beings; not because it 
could not be imagined otherwise) (PI: §6b). 
 
Ostensive teaching is here contrasted with ostensive explanations and definitions. 
Understanding ostensive definitions (or explanations) is said to require one to be able to 
ask (meaningfully) what the name of the definiendum (or explanandum) is. As it becomes 
more evident later in the text, the rationale for this requirement seems to be that giving 
an ostensive definition amounts to giving a name to what is thus defined, and grasping 
the name (knowing what something is called), would be manifest in the very possibility 
of meaningfully asking it (or correctly giving it if asked).  
Indeed, this is the way in which the point is phrased in On Certainty §535: 
 
535. The child knows what something is called if he can reply correctly to the 
question “what is that called?” 
 
In the following passages (OC: §§536-7) Wittgenstein suggests that a child who is 
moving the first steps into the acquisition of a first language cannot indeed know what 
something is called, since she lacks ‘the concept is called at all’. 
                                                          
9 I take this point to be non-controversial. See Rödl (2016) for a sensible description of the reality of 
infancy. 
10 The most influent rejection of behaviouristic accounts of language acquisition is in Chomsky (1959). It 
is worth stressing that Tomasello (2003: 3-4) thinks (and provides plenty of empirical evidence to think) 
that children are able to acquire a language precisely because they have learning abilities that go far 
beyond those posited by classical behaviourists. 
11 It occurs at OC (§434), but with a different sense. 
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Indeed, the giving and asking for names is a language-game that can be played only if it 
is already clear how the word is to be used (PI: §30, and similarly in OC: §527). 
Understanding how a word is to be used can span from understanding what is the role 
played by that word in a language (or in a bunch of language-games), to having been 
exposed to (or having participated in) some basic language-games (PI: §30-31). 
In the Philosophical Investigations, it is precisely in the discussion of what is required to be 
able to ask the name of something that Wittgenstein asks the question: 
 
One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what 
something is called. But what does one have to know? (PI: §30a-b). 
 
And it is in the section of On Certainty that follows §§534-537 that he explicitly points 
out: 
 
538. The child, I should like to say, learns to react in such-and such a way; and in 
so reacting it doesn’t so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a later level. 
 
The importance of denying the possession of any kind of knowledge to the infant is 
evident if one recalls Wittgenstein’s association between knowing, being able to doubt 
and thinking. Famously, in a crucial passage of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein 
notices that Augustine (questionably) describes the learning of a first language as the 
learning of a second language:12 
 
Someone coming to a foreign country will sometime learn the language of the 
inhabitants from ostensive explanations that they give him; and he will often have 
to guess how to interpret these explanations; and sometimes he will guess right, 
sometimes wrong. 
And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language 
as if the child came into a foreign country; that is, as if he already had a language, 
only not this one. Or again, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. 
And ‘think’ would here mean something like ‘talk to himself’ (PI: §32). 
 
In On Certainty (§480), Wittgenstein asks whether the possession of knowledge implies 
the possibility of being able to doubt, and asserts that doubting does involve thinking. 
Therefore, the possibility of knowing seems to imply the possibility of thinking, even if 
knowing something does not require one to think about it. Correlatively, according to 
Wittgenstein, saying that the child is able to doubt can only mean that the child has not 
yet learned how to play certain language-games (OC: §283): in a sense, doubting would 
prevent the child from learning the language-game at all.13 In another crucial section 
(OC: §91), Wittgenstein argues, more explicitly, that knowing that p requires one to have 
the right grounds for believing that p, and this is what makes the child unable to acquire 
knowledge. These conceptual connections between knowing, doubting and thinking 
offer deep reasons to deny that the child who is being introduced into a first language 
has, or is acquiring, (propositional, rather than irreducibly practical) knowledge.  
The characterisation of the first steps into language acquisition as a process of training 
thus amounts to characterizing the bedrock of our linguistic competency as the 
possession of primitive practical abilities. The significance of this characterization is 
                                                          
12 The distinction between the different kinds of knowledge involved in knowing a first and a second 
language has received much of its philosophical light by Michael Dummett (e.g., 1993: 94-105). 
13 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this point. 
RIFL (2018) Vol. 13, n. 2: 111-123 
DOI: 10.4396/20180205 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
116  
closely related to the core of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, since it invests his views 
on the highly specialized use of epistemic verbs, the nature of our most basic certainties 
and the relationships between language and thought. 
Before proceeding any further, it is worth pausing to notice that the sort of ‘training’ 
that Wittgenstein imagines children to undergo, require them to be able to react in 
certain ways (OC: §538). It is crucial to be clear about what ‘being able to react in 
certain ways’ amounts to in this context. According to Wolfgang Huemer (2006: 214, fn. 
12), empirical inquiries into first language acquisition will spell out the relevant abilities 
that pre-linguistic children must possess, and this specification cannot significantly 
affect Wittgenstein’s main point. On the contrary, I think that any specification of these 
abilities that posits, in some important sense, some kind of knowledge on the side of 
children, would be at odds with Wittgenstein’s remarks on what it is to learn a first 
language. 
In the next section, I will introduce Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language 
acquisition, emphasising that his understanding and application of a Gricean model of 
(pre-linguistic) communication seems to require children to be able to think (in the 
relevant sense) before they begin to speak. Correlatively, Tomasello seems to think that 
basic linguistic abilities are specimen of propositional knowledge. Importantly, the 
deployment of this particular intentional-inferential model of communication does play 
a crucial explanatory role in Tomasello’s theory of language acquisition. 
 
 
2. A usage-based theory of language acquisition 
Tomasello (2003) conceives of linguistic expressions and constructions as essentially 
serving communicative purposes, and their acquisition as based on an understanding 
and ability to produce (or reproduce) their intentionally communicative uses. 
Communication is said to have a relative priority over language because, from both a 
phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of view, children have (and early hominidis have 
had) an ability to communicate that does not hinge on any previously acquired linguistic 
convention (Tomasello 2008). Notably, Tomasello (2008: 57-60) elaborates this very 
idea of uniquely human ways of communicating pre-linguistically following 
Wittgenstein’s insights on the (both phylogenetic and ontogenetic) psychological 
priority of gestural communication over linguistic communication.14 
The communicative acts considered by Tomasello in this context are acts of pointing 
and pantomiming used as complete communicative acts, and not used as complements 
of (or substitutes to) an already acquired language (ivi: 60-61). According to Tomasello 
(ivi: 64-66, 117-126) these communicative acts are produced with a referential intention 
(the intention of directing someone’s attention to something) and a social intention (the 
reason why the communicator wants to direct the recipient’s attention to something).15 
Understanding a communicative act of pointing thus consists in grasping what the 
speaker is directing the recipient’s attention to, and for what reason. The main problem 
of communicating effectively with acts of pointing consists in the fact that the very 
same pointing gesture can be used on indefinitely many different occasions to direct 
someone’s attention to indefinitely many things (or events, or aspects of things or 
events…) for indefinitely many reasons (ivi: 3-4). 
                                                          
14 These insights are to be found in BT (24, 46). 
15 Not every communicative act is produced with a referential intention. Think, for instance, of acts of 
greeting someone. 
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It is worth noticing that Tomasello frames this problem in pretty much the same terms 
in which Wittgenstein frames his discussion about understanding ostensive definitions.16 
However, Tomasello (ivi: 154-157) draws a further (and telling) analogy between the 
position of the pre-linguistic creature and that of someone who visits a foreign country 
and does not yet know the language (quoting Quine’s famous presentation of the 
problem of radical translation). This analogy reinforces the impression that Tomasello 
sees the pre-linguistic infant with Augustinian eyes, that is, as already able to think prior 
to being able to speak. 
With respect to his proposed solution, Tomasello’s core idea is that the very possibility 
of communicating pre-linguistically is rooted in a more general ability to cooperate with 
others. This claim is twofold: first, our cooperative activities form the occasion for the 
production of communicative acts, as well as forming the circumstances that make our 
communicative acts intelligible to others. Second, communication is itself conceived as a 
cooperative activity, along the lines of the analysis originally proposed by Paul Grice. In 
what follows, I will offer a reconstruction of Tomasello’s position that tries to do justice 
to this interrelation between cooperation and communication. 
When we cooperate, we form a shared (joint, collective)17 intention to do something 
together. Each of us plays an individual role towards our common goal, and we jointly 
attend to the relevant situations at hand, each of us from an individual perspective 
(Tomasello 2014: 38-46). Crucially, when we form a shared intention in this sense, we 
have mutual knowledge18 of our common goal, individual roles and attentional states, and 
of our pro-social motivations of helping and sharing with others.19 
According to Tomasello (2008: 78-82), joint goals and joint attention, together with 
mutual assumptions of pro-social motivations, create the necessary common ground 
against which pre-linguistic children understand and produce communicative acts. 
Imagine that a child and his mother are putting away the toys together, and that she 
points to a puppet. He recognizes her protruding finger as an act of pointing, hence a 
communicative act, and understands that she is pointing to the object, and not, say, its 
shape or colour, because it is in their common ground (they mutually know) that they 
are putting away the toys together. 
The crucial component of this toy-example is that communicative gestures of the 
relevant kind are produced with a communicative intention that has a Gricean structure: 
the communicator wants the recipient to retrieve the content of a communicative act by 
making it mutually manifest that the she is trying to communicate in the first place. 
Since communicators mutually know that they have pro-social motivations of helping 
and sharing, communicative acts are recognised as performed intentionally to 
                                                          
16 Caveat: in this context, communicative acts of pointing are not acts of defining or explaining the 
meaning of a word. 
17  For the purposes of this paper, the stipulated distinctions between shared, joint and collective 
intentionality can be set aside. Different forms of shared intentionality do play an important explanatory 
role in Tomasello’s latest version of his theory (2014), since joint intentionality (joint intentions formed 
with particular others) underpins instances of pre-linguistic communication, while collective intentionality 
(collective intentions formed with a generic other) underpins mastery of linguistic conventions. 
18 Mutual knowledge is not necessary for establishing common ground. However, characterizing common 
ground with other propositional attitudes similarly apt to play the relevant role (e.g., mutual beliefs about 
accepted propositions) would not significantly alter the point of the present work. 
19  Tomasello (2014: 38-42) seems to borrow his conception of shared intentionality from Michael 
Bratman (1999). This is problematic in the context of language acquisition, both from a phylogenetic 
(Moore 2018) and an ontogenetic (Butterfill 2012) point of view. Further problems in Tomasello’s 
conception of shared intentionality are discussed by Hans Bernhard Schmid (2013). 
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communicate something that is relevant to the participants of the communicative 
exchange, in light of the joint activity in which they are engaged. Communicators are 
thus motivated (and able to) draw the relevance inferences20 that are necessary to understand 
the referential and social intention of a communicative act (ivi: 88-96). Prototypically, 
then, what grounds our understanding of particular instances of pointing is that we see 
them as produced in light of the common ground that we establish with others in the 
context of joint activities. 
A common complaint against Gricean models of communication is that they are 
cognitively too demanding and misrepresent the phenomenology of communication.21 
Suppose, for instance, that we are preparing a coffee together, and I want to inform you 
that the coffee powder is right behind the coffee machine. The communicative intention 
with which I produce my communicative act would have the structure of a fourth-order 
thought:22 I intend you to believe that I intend you to believe that the coffee powder is 
behind the coffee machine. The understanding of a communicative act produced with, 
say, a requestive motive would similarly require one to entertain high-order thoughts.  
Moreover, the production and understanding of informative communicative acts seem 
to require one to ascribe beliefs, and thus to have a mastery of the concept of belief. 
This is so because, on one hand, if one has an informative intention, one must be able 
to conceive others as knowledgeable or ignorant, that is, as having or lacking certain 
beliefs, or as having beliefs that can be true or false. On the other hand, and more 
generally, if understanding a communicative act implies being able to attribute 
communicative intentions to others, and the notion of intention is understood as 
comprising that of belief, understanding communicative intentions implies attributing 
beliefs to others. 
With respect to the first point, according to Tomasello pre-linguistic children do 
communicate with distinctively informative motives, and they do so in pretty much the 
same way in which adults do, even if in a far narrower set of circumstances.23 With 
respect to the second point, unfortunately Tomasello does not extensively discuss what 
counts as having an intention and being able to ascribe intentions. The suggestion 
(2014)24 seems to be the following: the notion of intention is primarily understood along 
the lines of the belief-desire model of rational action. Nonetheless, there are weaker 
forms of intentions that can be characterized with the notions of perception and goal-
state, and non-human great apes are (and to some extent understand others as) 
intentional agents in this weaker sense. In this frame, pre-linguistic children would be 
                                                          
20 This is the expression that Tomasello (2008: 89, 126, 140, 208) uses to talk about inferences that are 
drawn according to what is relevant on an occasion. 
21 This issue has been widely discussed in the literature about Grice (see, for instance, Avramides 1989: 
69-70). Here, I am very much indebted to Richard Moore (2014) for his excellent overview of this 
problem in the context of cognitive development.  
22 Even if well received, this is just one (proposed in Sperber & Wilson 1986) among several possible 
rendering of what it is to have an informative intention. 
23 Tomasello (2008: 109-145) presents the results of several experiments that are meant to show that all 
the main components of his cooperative model of human communication are in place in pre-linguistic 
children’s communicative interactions. Any alternative proposal about the ontogenetic development of 
linguistic and communicative abilities should be compatible with the empirical results obtained by 
Tomasello, even if not with his interpretation of those results. 
24 Tomasello frames his views on the nature of cognition following Barsalou’s approach (Barsalou 2008). 
This move might be the source of a further tension with Wittgenstein, if one takes On Certainty as 
pioneering a radical enactivism. A way out is here again offered by Moore’s views on communication and 
cognition, since they are compatible with non-cognitivist accounts. 
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intentional agents and would have a rudimentary understanding of others as intentional 
agents, but it is not clear what this rudimentary intentionality and understanding would 
consist in, exactly. 
Tomasello thus seems to attribute children (a rudimentary) ability to ascribe beliefs, and 
the mastery of the concept of belief requires one to understand that beliefs can be true 
or false.25 This is why success above chance in false belief tasks counts as a benchmark 
to assess one’s mastery of the concept of belief. The problem, here, is that pre-linguistic 
children typically struggle with false belief tasks, and when they succeed, they seem to be 
able to ascribe only belief-like states.26 
At the very heart of Tomasello’s theory thus lies a conception of infants’ development 
of linguistic abilities as presupposing some capacity to have high-order thoughts, a 
considerable degree of conceptual mastery and an ability to draw inferences about 
communicative intentions against a background of established mutual knowledge. This 
rendering of Tomasello’s theory seems to be in stark contrast to one of the most 
important tenets of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, namely, that the initial acquisition of 
a language does not presuppose any form of knowledge, and that thought should not be 
taken as explanatorily prior to language. 
This contrast is especially deep because Tomasello’s adoption of an intentional-
inferential model of communication to describe children’s early communicative 
interactions plays a key explanatory role in the context of his theory. Indeed, according 
to Tomasello (2008: 101), the development of linguistic abilities is (partially) grounded 
on a prior development of communicative abilities precisely because the psychological 
infrastructure of our understanding and mastery of pre-linguistic intentional 
communication is (a rudimentary form of) the same psychological infrastructure that 
underpins our understanding of genuinely linguistic communication. 
In the last section, I will present an alternative characterization of communicative acts 
recently proposed by Richard Moore that, in conjunction with other recently developed 
conceptual tools, might ease the main tensions between Wittgenstein and Tomasello. 
Even if Moore does not motivate his proposal by referring to the Wittgensteinian 
worries I have presented in the first section, his work clearly speaks to them. 
 
 
3. A functionalist way out? 
Richard Moore developed his views on communication and cognition arguing that 
communicative exchanges do not presuppose an adult-like cognitive sophistication, and 
can thus play a role in enhancing cognitive development. Moore’s strategy consists in 
isolating a class of basic communicative acts that count as Minimally Gricean, namely, as 
communicative acts that realize communicative intentions with a Gricean structure, but 
without presupposing that communicators have: 
 
(i) mastery of the concept of belief; 
 (ii) a capacity to form high-order thoughts; 
 (iii) human adult-like means of understanding others’ intentional states.27 
                                                          
25 This point can be traced to the works of Donald Davidson (2001: 129). 
26  Moore (2017) offers a useful overview of the literature about Gricean communication and the 
possession of the concept of belief. What would count as a belief-like state, and the sort of understanding 
that attributing this kind of states would require, remain highly controversial. For an interesting and 
influential proposal, see Apperly & Butterfill (2013). 
27 An alternative strategy would be to shift the cognitive burdens to a sub-personal level (Moore presents 
this option in his 2014 paper). However, shifting the recognition of communicative intentions and the 
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Minimally Gricean communicative acts can be enacted by a combination of acts that are 
functionally distinguished (or at least distinguishable). The relevant functions are those 
of getting someone’s attention and directing it to something. Importantly, their being 
functionally distinguishable implies that both acts can be grasped independently, and 
thus without necessarily forming high-order thoughts.  
On one hand, production and understanding of the attention-soliciting act can be 
implicit in well-rehearsed schemas of bodily interaction.28 On the other hand, the appeal 
to the concept of belief in understanding (and producing) the communicative intention 
can be substituted by an appeal to (keeping track of) perceptual or recognitional states, 
neither of which requires an understanding that beliefs can be false.29 
Finally, recently developed accounts of expressive communication 30  might speak in 
support of a way of understanding others’ goals and states that does not require much 
conceptual sophistication. Indeed, it has been argued that there is a class of expressive 
behaviours31 that give us a direct (i.e., non-inferential)32 access to others’ states of mind, 
while, at the same time, giving us hints on what those states of mind are about (if they 
are about something at all).33 Moore remains largely non-committal on the form of 
understanding others that is required to engage in minimally Gricean instances of 
communication. However, he (e.g. 2014: 101-102) explicitly argues in favour of the 
compatibility between his views on communication and enactivist accounts of 
cognition. 
Here I confined myself in sketching the alternative proposed by Richard Moore and 
others. The very structure of Minimally Gricean communicative acts, together with what 
is actually required for their production and understanding from a cognitive and 
motivational point of view, would require a far more extended development and 
scrutiny. 34  The important point is that (minimally) Gricean accounts of intentional 
communication might offer a way to reconcile one of the most promising and 
innovative theories of language acquisition, namely, Michael Tomasello’s, with some of 
the most important insights that can be found in Wittgenstein’s later reflections on 
language, knowledge and mind. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
processing of their content to the sub-personal level would again be at odds with Wittgenstein’s later 
conception of meaning and mind (see, e.g., Moyal-Sharrock 2016). 
28 Moore (2017: 231-232) argues that his characterization of minimally Gricean communicative acts does 
not require communicators to be able to articulate or even represent mutual knowledge. 
29  On Moore’s view (2014: 97, fn. 6) non-human great apes are capable of (minimal) intentional 
communication. This might partially undermine Tomasello’s claim about what is uniquely human. 
30 Moore (2014: 100-101; 2017: 314-317) refers to the theory developed in Bar-On (2013). 
31 Such as gaze behaviour, emotional expressions, emotionally charged body postures and intonations. See 
Moore (2017: 315). 
32 This strand of expressive behaviour can find an ally in Wittgenstein’s later reflection on the philosophy 
of psychology. 
33 The main problem is that here contents seem to be underdetermined. Perhaps what is needed is a 
plausible story on how we adapted in producing certain expressive behaviours and in reacting to them in 
certain ways. 
34 From a psychological point of view, the work of Gomez (e.g. 2004) is of primary importance in this 
respect. 
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